بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

Question and Answer

Question One:

The following was mentioned in the book of the System of Islam: “The rational process is the transfer of reality through the senses to the brain together with precedent information by which the brain explains the reality” – in nidham chapter 3 it actually says “Accordingly, the mind, intellect, or comprehension can be defined as the transmission of a sensed object through the senses to the brain and the existence of previous information by which this reality is explained”

The scholar Sheikh Nabhani, May Allah have mercy on him, has fully explained the importance of the presence of the previous information in the completion of the process of rational thought.

However, the acquisition of previous information necessarily requires a reception device present in man … This device must be hearing and sight, while the remaining senses of touch and smell and taste, cannot perform this function…

A child that is born blind and deaf cannot acquire any information, and therefore will not have a rational thought process, and accordingly cannot produce thought, despite the rest of the senses functioning normally.

The question is: Are all those who are deprived of the favour of hearing and sight since birth, not accountable?

If the answer is “No”, what about the words of Allah, Almighty: “deaf, dumb and blind, they do not understand.”

Answer:

The rational process requires four elements, namely the brain, senses, reality and previous information. As long as these four elements are sound, then the rational thought process would be complete. The one who is born blind and deaf, he would have deficiency in the senses and hence in his previous information. Thereby, his rational process will be dependent on his remaining senses and the obtained information.

Regarding previous information, the remaining senses of such people, such as touch for example, are stronger and more accurate than those who have sight.

Somebody told me that there was a blind man who once he met a person and shook his hand, i.e. touched his hand, and he then met him after a period of time and shook his hand, he was able to recognise him by just touching his hand.

In conclusion: A person would think as long as he had the four elements mentioned above. However, the the result of the rational process would be dependent on the availability of the previous four elements, either they were complete, safe and sound or they were incomplete or not sound …

The verse: “deaf, dumb and blind, so they do not understand,” is metaphoric, and not talking about those who are deaf, blind, and dumb physically; but rather those who ignore the senses they have, and do not use them correctly; so they are blind although they have sight; and they are deaf although they have ears, and dumb unable to speak although they have tongues. This verse is like the verse that says: “They have hearts wherewith they do not understand, and they have eyes wherewith they do not see, and they have ears wherewith they do not listen. Those are like the cattle; but they are rather worse; they are the heedless.”

3rd Rabee’ II 1432

02/06/2011

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Question Two:

Is the judge’s verdict which is in conflict with the adoption of the Khaleefah disallowed? If so, why it was not then mentioned with the three disallowed cases mentioned in the Draft Constitution, first volume, Article 83.

Answer:

The Judge’s verdict is disallowed in the three cases which we mentioned i.e. if he violated judgment by Islam and judged instead by the rules of Kufr, or he contradicted a definite divine text, or he violated the reality of the issue under judgment. This is the case if the Khaleefah did not adopt rules for such matters. However, if the Khaleefah adopted rules for such matters, then the duty of the judge is to judge in accordance with the adopted divine sources. Thus, he abides by the Qur’an, the Sunnah, the Ijma’a of the Sahabah and the Analogy (Qiyas), and thus he does not judge with Istihsan (personal preferenc) and the undefined interests (Masaalih Mursalah). As an example, he has to abide by the rule that prohibits muzaara’ah (share cropping) if this rule was adopted, and should not judge by a different rule.

If the judge ruled with a rule different from the adopted one, he would have violated the order of the Imam and would be subject for a punishment, besides his judgment would be disallowed. However, we have not mentioned this issue with the three cases, because the judge does not, in principle rule with other than the adopted rules.

It is obligatory upon every mujtahid to abandon the rule he reached through his ijtihad in any question if the Khaleefah has already adopted a ruling about it, because there is Ijma’a by the Sahabah that the order of the Imam settles the disputes.

3^rd Rabee’ II 1432

02/06/2011

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Question Three:

The word of (budget-meezaniyyah) came in the book of “The Economic System in Islam” under the subject of the State budget (Meezaniyyat ud-Dawlah), page 237. The two terms of (budget and financial balance- meezaniyyah and muwaazanah) came also in the book of “Draft Constitution – Part II”, page 114. Furthermore, the word (the general financial balance-muwaazanah ‘aammah) came in the book of “Funds in the Khilafah State” under the subject collections of Bait Al-Mal, page 28.

In my view, and because I work in the auditing profession, where  the use of these terms is part of my specialty, I see that it is not fit to have overlap in the use of these two terms as if they were the same though they are not so. Therefore, please revise the way in which these two terms are used.

The financial balance (muwaazanah) is the State’s plan for the future revenues and expenditures, and its forecast for these revenues and expenditures in terms of the adequacy of its resources and the areas of its expenditure.

The budget (meezaniyyah) is a financial report that describes the financial works of the State in terms of revenues and expenses as well as the payments due to her and upon her in the past year or for a financial period in the past. In other words, it is a summary of the financial movements that occurred in the previous period.

The former term speaks about the future planning, while the second term speaks about a historical summary.

“The Economic System” used the word of budget but was talking about the financial balance; and the book of “Draft Constitution” speaks about the financial balance and budget with the same meaning though it explains the issue of the financial balance, and the book of “Funds” refers to the financial balance as a financial balance.

In addition to this, the book of “The Economic System”, in its commentary on the issue of financial balance – which it mentions it using the term of budget – that came in page 239, it came out apparently with a result contrary to that it came out with in page 115 of “Draft Constitution.”??

The book of “The Economic System” says:  “Therefore, there is no room in Islam for the State to draw up an annual budget, as is the case in the democratic system, whether this is with regard to its sections, its appropriations and their items or the amounts required for each item or each appropriation. This is why no annual budget is drawn up for the Islamic State, though she has a permanent budget for which the Shar’a has determined its sections for both revenues and expenditures. The Khalifah reserves the right to determine the appropriations and their items, whenever it is required without linking that to a particular period.”

The book of “Draft Constitution,” says: (as long as the Khaleefah has the mandate to decide the chapters of the revenues and the amounts assigned to each chapter according to his ijtihad, then there is no reason to prevent setting up an annual budget for the State in its chapters and the amounts for each chapter, both in terms of the revenues or in expenditures. And what is forbidden is setting up an annual budget to terms of its chapters, rather than in terms of its revenues and expenses, because the chapters are decided by sharee’ah sources, so they are permanent).

I request you clarify this discrepancy and may Allah reward you.

Answer:

1 – Regarding that which came in the question, namely the difference between “financial balance” and “budget”, where “financial balance” is about the future financial situation of the State, while the budget is about the past financial situation of the State.

This definition is used by those for whom the chapters of the revenues and expenditures of the last year are different from those of the next year, regardless of the sections of the revenues and expenditures, such as that which is used by the man-made economic systems. They differentiate between such terms because the financial chapters in the past year, for example, differ from the chapters in the coming year in accordance with what they call ‘the legislature authority’, where it approves such a chapter or revokes it or amends it.

But in Islam, there is no difference between the past and future chapters of the revenues and the expenditures, for they are permanent; rather the difference lies with the sections in accordance with the opinion and ijtihad of the Khaleefah.

Therefore, the use of the terms of “financial balance” or “budget” is the same in our view, which is correct, especially as the origin of the derivation of the terms comes from the “weight and balance”. Whether you derive from it the term of financial balance or budget, it would denote comparison between two sides, such as one of them is in one side while the other is in the other side. This is in terms of the definitions.

With regards to the use of these terms, it is the same if both sides do not change in the past and the future, If it changes, then it is permissible to use this term for this effect and that term to that effect for the purpose of clarification. This is in terms of the use; but in terms of terminology it is the same.

2 – As for your observation of the difference between what is mentioned in Economic System, and what is mentioned in the Draft Constitution, this is rather an elaboration of what came in the Economic System.

It came in the Economic System:

“Democratic states put a general budget for the State each year. And the reality of the budget for the democratic State is that it is published as a law, called the Budget Law for such and such year, which is approved by the Parliament, and enacted as a law after its debate”

“The Islamic State has no annual budget, so it does not need every year to enact a law for it … because the revenues of bait ul-mal are collected according to the divine rules laid down by the sharee’ah texts, which are all of them permanent sharee’ah rulings. There is no room at all for opinion regarding the chapters of the revenues and the chapters of the expenditure. They are rather permanent chapters decided by permanent divine sources. This is in terms of the chapters of the budget. In terms of the sections of the budget, the amounts allocated to each chapter, and the items of each section for which these amounts are allocated, all of these are entrusted to the opinion and ijtihad of the Khaleefah; because this is part of discharging of the affairs, which Shar’ has entrusted the Khaleefah to decide as he views, and his order must be executed.

“The Islamic State does not need this, because the Treasury’s revenues are levied according to the Shari’ah rules stipulated by text and they are paid out according to the Shari’ah rules stipulated by text. All of these are permanent Shari’ah rules; hence, there is absolutely no room for opinion seeking with regard to the revenues and with regard to the expenditures. The sections in the budget are formed of permanent sections that have been determined by permanent Shari’ah rules. This is as far as the Budget sections are concerned; as for the appropriations of the budget and the amounts included in each appropriation as well as the matters for which these amounts are allocated in each appropriation, all of this is down to the opinion and the Ijtihad of the Khalifah. This is because it is part of looking after people’s affairs, which Shari’ah had conferred upon the Khalifah to decide based on what he deems fit; and his order is binding and must be executed.

Therefore, there is no room in Islam for the State to draw up an annual budget, as is the case in the democratic system, whether this is with regard to its sections, its appropriations its items or the amounts required for each item or each appropriation. This is why no annual budget is drawn up for the Islamic State, though she has a permanent budget for which the Shar’a has determined its sections for both revenues and expenditures. The Khalifah reserves the right to determine the appropriations and their items, whenever it is required without linking that to a particular period.”

It came in the Draft Constitution:

“The term of the budget or the financial balance is a Western terminology, which means statement of the revenues collected by the state, by explaining its chapters, which are the areas from which it is collected, and statement of its sections which are the branches of these chapters, beside the funds collected from such sections. In addition to that there is a statement of the expenditures spent by the State, through explaining of its chapters, which are the areas on which expenditures are made, and the explanation of its sections, i.e. the branches of these areas, and the statement of the funds spent on each item of these sections. This is the reality of the budget or the financial balance. This reality was not known by Muslims. They rather knew bait ul-mal, in which revenues are collected, and from which expenditures are spent. However, the presence of revenues for bait ul-mal and the presence of expenses from it represent a budget in reality, though it was not given such name. Therefore, there is nothing to prevent taking this word in that meaning, which is the sum of the chapters of revenues and the chapters of the expenditures, and the sections of each of them. Accordingly, the State would have a budget or a financial balance; and bait ul-mal is authorised of this budget.

As regarding of the preparation of this budget in terms of its chapters, its sections and the funds assigned to them, these are defined by the divine rules. The revenues have been defined by divine rules, such as the Kharaj and spoils. The expenditures have been also been defined by divine rules which showed also the method of such expenditures in terms of what is spent inevitably and what is spent only in case of having funds in bait ul-mal. Thus, revenues and expenditures are decided by divine rules, and accordingly the chapters of the budget are permanent, because they are decided by divine laws, and the divine laws do not change. As regarding of its sections, which are the branches of the budget, such as the Kharaj of non-irrigated lands, the Kharaj of the irrigated lands or their like, these are entrusted with the Khaleefah, as they are part of discharging of the affairs, and it is left to the opinion and ijtihad of the Khaleefah … As long as the Khaleefah has the power to decide the sections of the revenues and the funds allocated to each section according to his opinion and ijtihad, then there is nothing to prevent setting up an annual budget for the State in terms of its sections and the revenues allocated for each section, in both of the revenues and expenditures. And what is forbidden is to set up an annual budget for the budget’s chapters, whether for their revenues or their expenditures, because these were decided by divine laws, so they are permanent. “

Therefore, the Economic System mentioned:

* There is no annual budget for the chapters of the revenues and expenditures because they are permanent according to the divine laws…

* There is no limited budget “whether annual or not” for the sections of the revenues and expenditures, because they depend on the opinion and ijtihad of the Khaleefah…

* But the Khaleefah has the power to estimate the sections for the period he decides if the interest required that, without regard to a specific period.

It is clear from this that the Khaleefah is not obliged to set up a budget for the sections for a year or more or less. However, he has the right “when the interest requires that” to set up a budget for the sections, without regard to a specific period.

It came in the Draft Constitution:

* There is no reason to prevent the Khaleefah from setting up an annual budget for the sections…

* However, it is prohibited to set up an annual budget for the chapters of the budget, for they are permanent.”

It is clear from the Draft Constitution that there is no contradiction with that which came in the Economic System:

* In the Draft Constitution, it said that there is no reason to prevent the Khaleefah from setting up a budget…

* While the Economic System said the Khaleefah has the right to decide the sections when the interest requires without regard to a specific period…

This means he can set it up for half of a year or a year or two years…

As you can see, there is no contradiction.

As regarding that which came in the book of Funds it has used the word of financial balance (mizaaniyyah) in the future financial situation; and thus there is no problem in that.

18 Rabee’ II 1432

02/21/2011

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Question Four:

It came in the Book of Funds, page 35 the hadith (Spoils-ghanaa’im were not allowed for any of the black heads before you …), what is the meaning of ‘the black heads?’

Answer:

The term of the black head mentioned in the hadith of Abu Hurayrah, where the word of ‘any’ is added to the black is:

What are meant by the black heads metaphorically are the sons of Adam, on the grounds that their heads are black, i.e. the spoils were not allowed to any one of the sons of Adam before Muhammad (peace be upon him)…

27 Rabee’ II 1432

03/02/2011

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Question Five:

It came in the hadith about the Magi that ‘Umar ibn al-Khattab mentioned the Magi and said I do not know how to deal with them. ‘Abdul Rahman bin Auf said I bear witness that I heard the Messenger of Allah, peace be upon him said: “Apply to them the law applied upon the people of the Book”. The scholars interpreted it as taking the head tax (jizyah) from them in return of protecting their blood, and nothing else. Is the increase that came in the hadith, which is: “without marrying their women and nor eating their slaughtered meat,” is valid, or it is ijtihad and understanding of the text?

Answer:

Regarding the hadith, (Apply to them …

There are ahadith that did not mention “without marrying their women and nor eating their slaughtered meat,” and these are some of them:

– Malik ibn Ja’far reported from ibn Muhammad ibn ‘Ali from his father that ‘Umar ibn al-Khattab said I do not know how to deal with them. ‘Abdul Rahman bin Auf said I bear witness that I heard the Messenger of Allah, peace be upon him said: “Apply to them the law applied upon the people of the Book”.

– Ibn Abi Shaybah reported in his Workbook from Ja’far from his father, he said: (‘Umar said while setting between the tomb and the pulpit: I do not know how to deal with the Maju who are not the people of the Book. ‘Abdul Rahman ibn Awf said I heard the Messenger of Allah, peace be upon him said: “Apply to them the law applied upon the people of the Book”.)

– But Ibn Abi Shaybah said in another narration, in his Workbook, the reason of the question, which was about the head tax (jizyah) of the Magi. Thus the question was about the head tax. He said in that narration that Wakee’ told us, followed by Sufyan and Malik bin Anas from Ja’far from his father that ‘Umar ibn al-Khattab consulted the people about the Magi regarding the jizyah. Abdul Rahman bin Auf said: (I heard the Messenger of Allah, peace be upon him, said: “Apply to them the law applied upon the people of the Book”.)

This means that the subject was about taking the jizyah from the Magi. Therefore, the hadith of the Prophet, peace be upon him, was evidence to it, ie, the ruling of the jizyah regarding the Magi is the same ruling for the people of the Book, and thus it does not go beyond it to cover other matters such as the marriage and slaughtered meat.

– And this is what the Shafi’i mentioned on the subject. For al-Bayhaqi reported in the information about the Sunan and reports, he said:

Abu Bakr, Abu Zakariya, and Abu Saeed, said: Abu Abbas told us, Al-Rabee’ told us, Al-Shafi’i told us, Malik told us from Ja’far ibn Muhammad from his father that ‘Umar ibn al-Khattab mentioned the Magi and said: I do not know how to deal with them. ‘Abdul Rahman bin Auf said I bear witness that I heard the Messenger of Allah, peace be upon him said: “Apply to them the law applied upon the people of the Book.” Al-Shafi’i said in our account from Abu Said: If that was confirmed, then it is related to taking of the jizyah, and not regarding the marrying of their women and eating of their slaughtered meat.

This is regarding the ahadith that did not mention “without marrying their women and nor eating their slaughtered meat”…

However, there are ahadith that mentioned this explicitly:

Ibn Abi Shaybah reported in his Workbook from al-Hasan ibn Muhammad “that the Prophet, peace be upon him, wrote to the Magi, the people of Hajar inviting them to Islam; so whoever of them became Muslim it would be accepted of him; but whoever did not become Muslim a jizyah is imposed upon him, without marrying their women and nor eating their slaughtered meat».

Al- Haythami mentioned similar to this hadith in his book (the desired objective of the researcher- Bughyat ul-Baahith) about the extras that came in Musnad of Al-Harith; he said Abdul Aziz ibn Aban told us, seconded by Sufian from Qays ibn Muslim from al-Hasan ibn Muhammad ibn Ali ibn Abi Talib, he said: “The Messenger of Allah, peace be upon him, wrote to the Magi, the people of Hajar inviting them to Islam; so whoever of them became  Muslim it would be accepted of him; but whoever did not become Muslim a jizyah is imposed upon him, without marrying their women and nor eating their slaughtered meat”.

1st Rabee’ II 1432

03/06/2011

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Question Six:

It came in p. 97, at the end of the third line in the book of the Draft Constitution, Volume II the following text: “As regards the words of Allah, The Almighty: (And give its due right on its day of harvest), Al-An’aam, verse 141. Zakat did not come in this verse for it is revealed in Makkah, while the Zakat was enacted in the Madinah; and that is why it mentioned the Pomegranate which there is no zakat of one tenth on it… “

The book of Funds mentioned in p. 161, first line after the title: “Zakat on crops and fruits is obliged by the Qur’an and Sunnah; as for the Qur’an it is by His (swt) saying: “And give its due right on its day of harvest”, Al-An’aam, verse 141.

The question is how we use the verse as evidence for the obligation of the Zakat, though we say that the verse does not include Zakat, as it came in the Draft Constitution. In other words, how we make it evidence for obliging zakat upon crops and fruits? Should not we publish correction about it?

Answer:

What is stated in the Draft is more detailed than that which is mentioned in the Funds; and they however conform to each other:

The verse of “And give its due right on its day of harvest” is not valid to use to infer the Zakat in generality, i.e. to say there is zakat in all of crops, because it is a Makkiyyah verse, where the Zakat has not been enacted then.

However, there are others who use it as evidence, but not general in every crop, rather it is used as mentioned in the Draft Constitution:

A – Regarding that which is cropped,

B – And that it is summed (mujmal) that needs elaboration.

Accordingly, it was stated in the Draft: “If we assumed they fall within the zakat, then this applies on that which is harvested, because the pomegranate is not harvested, thus it came in summed (mujmal) form, and the ahadith came to mention that zakat is taken from the harvested crops, which are the wheat and barley. The ahadith added other two types, which are of dates and raisins. In any case, as long as the verse has been revealed in Makkah, where the Zakat was not enacted yet, then this is sufficient to reject its use as evidence. “

In other words, it is not used as evidence for the Zakat on all crops, because the context of the text lacks its use for reasoning the Zakat of all crops; but it can be referred to in that which is harvested, and that it is of summed (mujmal) form where the ahadith elaborated it.

As for the Funds, it was mentioned as summed (mujmal), like quoting the summed (mujmal) hadith in Zakat “Tenths (Zakat) are taken from what is irrigated by rivers and rain …”. The summed evidences are not alone enough, because they need elaboration (bayaan); and their elaboration comes in the ahadith that made zakat only from wheat, barley, dates, raisins, and they have to reach a certain amount (nisaab) … etc..

Thus, it is not allowed to use as evidence that which is summed (mujmal) unless followed by elaboration (bayaan). Therefore, they were mentioned in the Funds as summed, and then they were followed by the elaborating ahadith. So, it said in the Funds:

“Zakat of crops and fruits are obliged by Qur’an and Sunnah. As for the Qur’an, it is His (swt) saying “And give its due right on its day of harvest”, [Al-An’aam, 141].As for the Sunnah it is the saying of the Prophet, peace be upon him: “There is no Zakat in less than of five wasaqs“, agreed upon it …End quote.

After all, had it been explained in the Funds as it were in the Draft it would have been better … However, I do not see a need for its correction, on condition that it is understood as detailed in the Draft.

4th Rabee’ II 1432

03/09/2011

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Question Seven:

Is it permissible to read the Qur’an on the pattern of “maqamaat-sort of rhythm”, using as evidence the hadith that says: «He is not one of us that does not sing with Qur’an»? I have heard from someone that there is another hadith which is opposite to this, ie, «He is not one of us that sings with Qur’an», and, accordingly, he replied that acting upon both hadiths indicates dislike of singing with Qur’an. Is this true?

Answer:

Muslim narrated from Abu Hurayrah, he said: The Messenger of Allah, peace be upon him, said: «He is not one of us that does not sing with Qur’an”; others added ‘spoke out of it.’

Al-Hakim reported it in his book (Al-Mustadrak) through Saad bin Malik, may Allah be pleased with him, and said that it is of sound narration, but they did not narrate it through this chain. It was also reported in the Musnad of Abd ibn Hamid, and the Musnad of Al-Qadaa’i.

There was difference in the interpretation of the word “sing ‘ustaghna‘ with it”:

– It was interpreted by Sufyan bin ‘Uyaynah as “dispense with it”, meaning that the one that does not dispense with Qur’an from amassing worldly matters he is not of us; ie he is not following our way.

– Ibn Al-A’raabi interpreted it as letting Qur’an be his hijjir (ie his habit and his issue) like the traveler and the free of work make singing their habit,

Ibn Al-A’raabi said the Arabs used to sing when they mounted on camels, as well as when they sat in their yards and in most of their situations. When the Qur’an was revealed the Prophet, peace be upon him, wanted their habit to be reading Qur’an instead of singing.

– Al-Layth ibn Sa’d explained it saying: sing with it means be saddened of it and softening the heart with it, as it was reported from him by Abu ‘Awaana

– According to Tabari, Al- Shafi’i was asked about the interpretation of Ibn ‘Uyaynah of (taghanni) as dispensing of it, but he did accept it and said: Had the hadith meant dispensing with it it would have said (lam yastaghni– he did not dispense of it),; he rather meant to beautify the voice. And Al-Tabari said, “Had its meaning been dispense of it then there was no need to mention speaking out of it in the other narration.” (And others added speaking out with it)”.

Thus, what I outweigh is that singing with Qur’an means improving the voice by reading the Qur’an according to the rules of recitation reported from the Messenger of Allah, peace be upon him, which is supported by the hadith of the Prophet, peace be upon him, narrated by Ahmad, Abu Dawood, Nasa’i and Ibn Majah from Al-Baraa’ ibn ‘Aazib, that the Messenger of Allah (saw) said: «Beautify Qur’an with your voices».

So, the meaning is to improve the reading by voice according to the rules of recitation which were soundly reported from the Messenger of Allah, peace be upon him. The one who does not sing with Qur’an in this manner, ie the one who does not improve recitation with his voice according to the reported recitation rules, he would not be, in terms of reading, following the way which the Prophet Muhammad, peace be upon him ordered to recite with.

– As regarding recitation musical tones/patterns  “called maqamaat and their like…..” the scholars differ about it in terms of reading by musical tones: Can this reading be regulated according to the rules of the readings or not? Accordingly, some of them said that reading by musical tones is haram because it goes outside the rules of reading, where there is stretching in the letters and departure from its known limit. While others made it conditional: if reading by musical tones did not depart from the right mode it would be allowed, otherwise it would not be allowed … etc…

That which I outweigh is that reading by musical tones is not allowed because most likely the letters are not regulated according to the rules of readings. I have read on this issue, ” it is often that the one who takes account of the melodies of reading would not take account of the performance,” and this is what I outweigh to happen when reading by musical tones.

This is regarding the hadith that says “He is not one of us that does not sing with Qur’an”.

As regards the other hadith that says: “He is not one of us the one who sings with Qur’an”, I do not know that there is a hadith like this.

In conclusion: The improvement of reading of the Qur’an by good voice according to the rules of recitation is a desirable matter, ie mandoob. Reading of the Qur’an by hymns is not permissible, where the letters go beyond the limits decided by the rules of readings, and they include stretching of the letters that depart them from the rules of readings transmitted from the Messenger of Allah, peace be upon him, as it is usually the case in the tunes.

7 Rabee’ II 1432

12/03/2011

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Question Eight:

The following came in the Book of the Economic System, p. 268, the sixth line: “If a man bought a true dinar by two forged dinars it is not permissible”

It also came in p. 289, line 12 in the same book ‘and the exchange rate between the two States is then the ratio between the weight of the pure gold in the currency of the first State and the weight of the pure gold in the currency of the second State “

I understood from the text mentioned in the first place and the subsequent clarification that it is not allowed to exchange the forged two dinars by a true dinar though the pure gold contained in the two forged dinars might be equal to the weight of pure gold in the true dinar. Therefore, the understanding I got is that when you exchange the gold of 24 carats with gold of 21 carats, for example exchange will not be except by weight for weight despite the different proportion of pure gold in both carats. What was stated in the second place mentions explicitly that the exchange will be by the ratio of the weight of pure gold, and not a weight for weight as I understood from the first place? Which of the two understandings is correct, and how can we reconcile between the two statements. In other sense, what counts in the process of exchange? Is it the weight of each of the two gold slugs regardless of the weight of pure gold in each of them, or it is the weight of pure gold in both gold slugs?

My attention was drawn by that which came in p. 268, that the evidence of not allowing to sell the true dinar by two forged dinars is the objection of the Prophet, peace be upon him, to the exchange of the Berni (good) dates by the lousy dates, one saa’ for two saa’ (volume measure) despite the fact that the exchange of dates for dates is sale, while exchange of the true dinar by the forged dinar is an exchange process. Furthermore, the Berni (good) dates and the lousy dates are both pure dates which are not mixed with anything else, while the forged gold is not pure gold, but rather mixed with impurities. I see the two realities different from each other, and they are not replaced by each other.

In essence, when the gold of certain carat is exchanged by gold of different carat, will exchange be weight for weight, regardless of the carats of each of them, or what counts is the equal weight of pure gold in each of them, for difference of carat necessarily means variation of the ratio of pure gold in both gold slugs?

Answer:

The question is as follows:

1 – Exchange of gold for gold is the like for the like; and the word of “gold” is a genus name that applies to everything that is called gold, whether it was of 18, 21 or 24 carats…

If you want to exchange it you do that by weight for weight. Once offer and acceptance were concluding then it is not allowed to repeal/revoke the exchange, on condition that there is no cheating in the exchange. In other words, if you had gold of 24 carats and the other side had gold of 18 carats; thus no one of you should hide from the other side the type of gold he had.

If however, he said he had gold of 24 carats, and after the exchange as the like for the like was completed the other side discovered that the gold is of 21 carats then there is fraud in this case, which allows revoking of the exchange. The side that was deceived has the choice of either accepting or completing the exchange, or to revoke it, and each of the two sides takes back his own gold. However, the one side that had gold of 24 is not allowed to take from the owner of the gold of 21 the difference (of weight or value) between them, because both types are gold, and thus it is not allowed to differentiate between them.

This is the interpretation that was mentioned in the Economic System, page 267: (If somebody bought gold of 24 carats for gold of 24 carats, and then one of the two dealers found the gold he took was of 18 carats, then this is considered cheating, and he has the choice between either revoking or accepting the exchange. However, if he wanted by exchanging the gold for gold to accept the money with its flaw, on condition of taking from the other side the shortage of its price due to its flaw, this would not be allowed because of the increase in one of the two types of exchanged gold, and because the obliged similarity in the same genus is missing).

2 – As regarding that mentioned in page 268: (and if a person bought from somebody else one true dinar for two forged dinars this is not permissible. But, if he bought a true dinar by dirhams of silver and he then bought by the dirhams two forged dinars, this would be allowed, whether he bought them from the same trader or from any body else. This is due to what is narrated from Abu Said who said: “Bilal brought to the Prophet, peace be upon him, Berni (good) dates, the Messenger of Allah, peace be upon him said: From where is this?, Bilal said: We used to have lousy dates, and I then sold two saa’s of it for one Berni saa’ as food for the Prophet peace be upon him. The Messenger of Allah, peace be upon him said then: “Oh, this is riba itself, so you do not do that; rather if you wanted to buy dates, then you sell it for something else, by which you buy the dates ‘you want'” narrated by Muslim.)

The sense of reasoning the impermissibility of trading two pounds of lousy dates for a pound of good dates and its application to objection of exchanging two forged dinars for one true dinar is a sound inference. However, your rejection of the inference by saying: “The reality of the substitution of lousy dates for good dates is sale, while the substitution of the true dinar for the forged dinars is exchange”. This statement is not correct, for the exchange is sale; but selling gold for gold is called exchange.

Look at the beginning of the subject page 266: (exchange transactions: No matter how much numerous and various are the exchange transactions, they do not depart from being a sale of one currency for another currency of the same genus, and a sale of one currency for another currency of two different genus’s).

3 – As regards that which you mentioned in page 289:

(The exchange rate between the two countries would then be the ratio between the weight of the pure gold in the currency of the first country and the weight of the pure gold in the currency of the second country).

This is a different issue, for this is not the issue of “true and forged”, but rather an Islamic dinars and English pound, for example. When they are exchanged the same process has to be followed which is “the like for the like.” If the Islamic dinar represents “4.25” gram of gold of 24 carats, while the English pound represents  “”2.125 ” gram of gold of 21 carats, then the exchange must be the like for the like.

So, the Islamic dinar is equivalent to “4.25” grams of gold, which is equal to 2 English pounds of (ie, 2 × 2.125 grams = 4.25 grams) regardless of the type of gold. This means it is not permissible to say that the gold of 21 is less than the gold of 24 , so I want double and an increase as well … This is not permissible, because what is called gold, whether it was 24, 21,18, it would be exchanged by the same weight. And once the offer and acceptance were concluded, then the sale would not be invalidated, on condition that there is no cheating, which means each one of the two dealers should inform the other of the type of the gold he had.

If there were fraud, i.e. if the English was malignant, which is the case, and the Muslim was naive, and sometimes he is so, and the English said to the Muslim that when you exchange my banknote in the English bank they will give you for it 2.125 grams of gold of 24 carat, so the Muslim took two of them, and gave him the Islamic dinar, whose value is 4.25 grams, where the naive Muslim believed the words of the malignant English. When the Muslim went to the bank and gave it the two pounds banknotes he took in replace of them 4.25 grams of gold 21. In this case, it is permissible for the Muslim to return to the English choosing one of two options, either he accepts the sale, or he revokes it, where each one of them would take his gold; but it is not allowed to take the difference (between the two currencies), because gold is exchanged for gold, and the like for the like as long as they are called gold.

Of course, the English would be subject to punishment of fraud if the transaction took place in Dar al-Islam, unless if the English was an ambassador, where it will be enough to expel him as punishment for the fraud!

10 Rabee’ II of 1432

03/15/2011

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Question Nine:

The following came in the book of Funds, in the second paragraph of p. 174 “and these reliable (covered with gold) banknotes consider the covered ratio of them as representative banknotes ……… ….. (and it says at the end of the paragraph) …..if they did not amount to forty dinars, then there is no Zakat in them”

The question is: Is it not possible to view the reliable banknotes in terms of considering the covered part of them as representative banknotes, where Zakat of gold or silver applies to them according to their coverage? While the  percentage which is not covered is considered fiat “mandatory” money, where they fulfill the reason (‘illah) of money and price like the fiat money, and thus they will be covered by the ahadeeth that oblige Zakat in the two currencies of gold and silver?

Answer:

Currency is as follows:

1 – The substance of gold and silver, whose Zakat is clear.

2 – Paper currency that represents all that which is written on it. If it was written on it the word of Islamic dinar, 4.25 gm gold, this paper of “dinar” is treated as if it were a golden dinar, ie a tangible substance. So, this banknote is subject to Zakat according to what is written on it on condition that the banknote can be substituted by gold at any time. This means if you had twenty banknotes of “85” gm of gold, thus reaching the minimum amount (nisaab), then Zakat is taken from them. This is the meaning of the representative banknotes, which means they can be substituted at any time at the State Bank for their full value.

3 – A representative paper money/banknote, but what is written on it is not exchanged for the gold value written on it, but rather for a ratio of it. As an example, dinar is written on it (it is called dinar among people during transactions), but when you take this banknote to the State Bank they give you 2.125 gm gold, ie a half of gold dinar This means the nisaab will be met when you have forty banknotes of them (40 × 2.125 = 85). In this case, it is incorrect to say that this banknote on which dinar is written is divided into two parts: half of it is representative, while the other half is fiat (mandatory). This is incorrect, because it is the same banknote, and it is used in the market dealings with the trading power of the amount of 2.125 gm of gold, and nothing else.

In other words, its trading value is not 2.125 gm of gold + something else!

So, its reality is that it is a banknote whose value is 2.125 gm of gold, and nothing more.

4 – As for the mandatory banknote, it is not exchanged for gold as it is written on it. In other words, whether a dinar or ten dinars was written on it, there is no point in that because it is not exchanged for gold at all. It is incorrect to say you can purchase a quantity of gold with it, so why this is not considered to be a cover, and accordingly the mandatory banknote is a reliable banknote for an amount of gold.

This is not the case, because in order to consider the full representative banknote, or the reliable banknote, which is proportionally representative (ie not fully covered), their value in gold must be known and fixed, and it can also be exchanged in the State Bank, at any time. The absence of these two conditions: “the known golden value and the replacement of this value at any time” excludes it of the representative banknote.

It is clear that the mandatory banknote is not like that, for it has no fixed and known cover which is subject to exchange at the State Bank of gold at the desired time. Rather, it is not more than a banknote subject to exchange for a known ratio since America’s declaration in 1971 of the abolition of exchanging the dollar with gold.

Accordingly, regarding the mandatory banknote it is treated as a currency in the divine provisions because of the reason (‘illah) of being a currency; and Zakat is taken of it after knowing of its value in the market, in gold or silver. If its total purchase value reached twenty dinars of “85 gm gold” it would have reached the nisaab, or if it reached two hundred dirhams “595 gm silver” it would have reached the nisaab. If this amount remained after paying the debt…, and one year has passed, then the Zakat is obliged. I tend in this issue to consider the lower nisaab enough to oblige the Zakat . So, if it reached the nisaab of the silver, which is the lower at these days, its owner would be subject to Zakat.

10 Rabee’ II 1432

03/15/2011

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Question Ten:

It came in the book of the Economic System, page 90, line 6 from the top:

“Because the lease must be known, and the failure of mentioning the duration in some works makes it unknown.  And if the lease was unknown it would not be allowed.”

It came in the same page, line 14:

“If the period was mentioned in the contract, or if its mention in the contract was necessary to remove the unfamiliarity, then this period must be specified by a duration of time, such as a minute, an hour, a week, a month or a year.”

It also came in page 91, line 8, of the same book:

“In conclusion, the wage must be known in a way that removes the unfamiliarity, so that it can be fulfilled without dispute. This is because the basic principle in all of the contracts is to prevent the disputes between the people. There must be an agreement upon the wage before the start of work; and it is disliked to use of an employee before agreement over the wage with him. “

The question is: Does the word “must” mean the usual obligation used in the provisions of accountability (takleef), meaning the obligation whose disclaimer is considered sinful? If this is the case, why it is then said in page 91, line 11: “and it is disliked to use the employee before agreement with him over the wage.” How can we reconcile between the word “should” mentioned above, and the word of “disliked” in the last text? All of the texts mention that it is not allowed to conclude a contract that includes unfamiliarity.

If the contract is invalid for failing to mention the wage and the worker is entitled of the wage of his equivalent; and we mention that the one involved in an invalid contract is considered sinful until the invalidity was adjusted. Understanding that there is no sin in the disliked matter, how then we say it is disliked, and he is sinful if he did not mention the wage, thus invalidates the contract?

I wish you clarify this, May Allah bless you.

Answer:

It was mentioned in the Economic System:

In page 90, it said: “If the period was mentioned in the contract, or if its mention in the contract was necessary to remove the unfamiliarity, then this period must be specified by a duration of time, such as a minute, an hour, a week, a month or a year.”

In page 91, line 8, it said: “In conclusion, the wage must be known in a way that removes the unfamiliarity, so that it can be fulfilled without dispute. This is because the basic principle in all of the contracts is to prevent the disputes between the people. There must be an agreement over the wage before the start of work; and it is disliked to use an employee before the agreement over the wage with him”.

And you ask, thinking that there is a conflict: at one time we say (must), and say (disliked) at another time!

* As for that mentioned in page 90, it is clear, and nothing strange in it, as it speaks about defining the time term as “obligatory”, and that if it was not specified in a way that removes unfamiliarity, the lease is not allowed, ie it is invalid. This is clear, without ambiguity.

* As regards what is mentioned in page 91, it is two issues which you thought them one:

The first issue: That the wage is known in a way that removes unfamiliarity. So, it is not allowed to specify his wage as in the example mentioned at the top of page 91 itself by saying to him: “your wage is part of the crops you harvested”, this is not allowed. Rather, his wage must be specified in a clear known way that removes the disputes, such as saying “your wage is a saa or a mudd; or collect to me the crops of these ten acres, and your wage is the crops of this acre …”; this means the provision here is obligation.

The second issue: It is not related to the obligation of that the wage, once specified, must be known in a way that removes unfamiliarity, but related to determining the wage of the employee before using him: Do you tell him of his wage before using him, or you use him before determining his wage? The ruling in this case is the dislike, namely not prohibited, so the employment contract would not be invalid, but rather the worker is given the wage of the equivalent…

* Thus, the question is of two issues:

First: When you determine a wage it must be known in a way that removes unfamiliarity, otherwise it is invalid.

Second: When you hire the employee; would his appointment be after defining his wage or before defining his wage? Provision in this case is the dislike, which means the appointment is valid, and the employee is entitled of the wage of the equivalent. In other words:

– When you hire the employee, it is disliked to use him before determining his wage.

– And when you determine the wage of the employee in the appointment contract it must be known in a way that removes the unfamiliarity.

15 Rabee’ II 1432

20/3/2011

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Question Eleven:

Is there a difference between the divine fact and the divine meaning?

We have confusion in the matter, as one of the members said in a monthly circle:

The divine fact transfers the linguistic meaning to a new meaning different from the origin, such as the word of prayer (salah).

As for the divine meaning: it uses the same linguistic meaning, and adds to it a regulator or a constraint, such as the word of (qiblah). Is this true?

If there is a difference, I request your elaboration due to the following:

a – It was mentioned in the Economic System, page 205, under the subject of extravagance (israaf) and waste (tabdheer) “Its meaning is spending the money in the prohibited matters,” where a member said this is a divine meaning rather than a divine fact.

b – It came in the book of Tayseer on the situations of interpretation (tafseer) page 190 at the interpretation of “What turned them away from their qiblah”, the verse.  It said regarding the interpretation of “their qiblah” that the qiblah is on the form of ‘fi’lah’ that comes from ‘muqaabalah’, ie (meeting face to face), like the word “wijhah” that comes from “muaajahah”, ie (coming face to face). This word ‘qiblah” became to have a divine meaning, which is the direction to which the Muslim turns during the prayer (salah). It called it a divine meaning rather than a divine fact.

c – We referred to the subject of the divine fact in Shakhsiyyah, vol III, but we did not find a difference in the subject.

Please advise us if there is a differentiation between the divine fact and the divine meaning, may Allah bless you.

Answer:

The divine fact is a term…

The divine meaning is a meaning…

So, the two issues do not conflict with each other!

It came in vol III of Shakhsiyyah:

– Page 149, the four lines from the end: “The divine fact is a term which al-Shar’ has used in a meaning different to the meaning coined to it; and Arabs used it after the use of Shar’ in the meaning used by al-Shar’. So, it was transferred through the use of al-Shar’ and then through the use of Arabs to another meaning, while the first meaning was abandoned …”

– Page 143, lines 9 and10: “The divine fact is the term which is used in what is coined to it in the convention of al-Shar’…”

– Page 144, lines 4 and 5: “The divine fact is the term which al-Shar’ coined for a meaning, such that it denotes it without collaboration (qareenah) …”

Thus, the divine fact is a term which Arabs used in a divine meaning other than its linguistic meaning, and the linguistic meaning was abandoned while the divine meaning dominated. This is like salaat (prayer), whose linguistic meaning is du’aa (suplication), and al-Shar’ gave it a divine meaning; ie al-Shar’ transferred it from the linguistic meaning to the divine meaning which dominated. Thus, this term of “salah” in the divine meaning, ie the “specific movements” became a divine fact.

Accordingly, if you want to know what the type of the word is, we examine:

1 – If that word was used in its linguistic meaning then it is a linguistic fact.

2 – If it was transferred from its linguistic meaning to the conventional (‘urfi) meaning, and it dominated in it, and the linguistic meaning was abandoned, then it is a conventional fact.

3 – If it was transferred from the linguistic meaning to a divine meaning and it dominated in it and the linguistic meaning was abandoned, then it is a divine fact.

Therefore, the word is examined; if it was used in a divine meaning, then it is a divine fact:

You can say: Prayer (salah) has a divine meaning, which is used in that meaning and dominated in it, so prayer is a divine fact.

And you say: Qiblah has a divine meaning, which is used in it and dominated in it, so qiblah is a divine fact.

However, you can say the word of prayer (sala) has a such and such divine meaning, without necessarily completing the description, so we say it is a divine fact.

And it is not also necessary to say the word of qiblah has such and such divine meaning…. (And it is not necessary to complete this by saying so it is a divine fact.)

Thus, the divine fact is a word that has a divine meaning in which it dominated.

I hope the difference between the divine fact and the divine meaning became clear to you; so they are not synonymous, but they are rather consistent with each other like this: the divine fact is a word used in a divine meaning which it dominated in it, and its linguistic meaning was abandoned. As information: what is meant by saying the linguistic meaning was “abandoned” is that once you hear the word, the mind does not turn to the linguistic meaning except with a collaboration (qareenah).

15 Rabee’ II 1432

20/3/2011

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Question Twelve:

The term of falsafah “philosophy” came in the bock of the Structure (at-Takattul), and we understand from it ‘the idea of Islam.’ But why the Party chose to use this term despite the controversy about it? Should not we used another term or another word such as Fikrah (idea), in order to avoid the objection that might come; because the Party criticized the philosophers, in more than one place of its books.

Answer:

The use of the word of philosophy in the Tkattul (structure) comes in accordance of our definition that it is blending of matter with the spirit (rooh); blending the matter with the awareness of relation with Allah, the Almighty; which means arbitration to the law of Allah in worldly life, the state and the society.

The following came in the book of Concepts (Mafaaheem) in page 36:

“Hence, the philosophy of Islam is blending the matter with the spirit, which means conducting the actions in accordance with the orders and prohibitions of Allah. This philosophy was permanent and necessary for every action, no matter how much it is little or large, or simple or great. It was the characterization of life. Since the Islamic doctrine (‘aqeedah) is the basis of life, the basis of philosophy and the basis of systems, then the Islamic civilization – which is the host of concepts about life from the perspective of Islam – is based on one spiritual basis, that is the doctrine (‘aqeedah); and its characterization of life was blending the matter with the spirit; and the meaning of happiness in its view is (attaining of) the pleasure of Allah. “

So, you see there is nothing in the use of this word of “philosophy” in the sense mentioned above.

After reflecting upon the subjects it have been used in, you find it clear in this sense; and it is a response to the corrupt/invalid philosophies, and it is far from being confused with the situations of the philosophers who went astray or became infidel when they involved themselves in philosophy on other than the basis which we have pointed out.

Here are some of the subjects:

– Page 5 “As regarding the subject of the idea and the method, it is apparent in the error of the philosophy upon which these movements were established, assuming that they had a philosophy …”

– Page 7, “We believe that the true philosophy for revival is an ideology that combines the idea and the method together; and that this ideology is Islam, because it is a doctrine from which a system emanates for all the affairs of the State and the nation, and for addressing all of the problems of life …”

– Page 9 “We said that the true philosophy for revival is an ideology that combines the idea and the method together; and they must be understood by every structure/group that aims at undertaking a serious action that leads to revival.”

– Page 11, 12: “The foreign culture had the greatest influence in the concentration of the ideas of infidelity and colonialism, and in the failure of revival, and in the failure of the movements, whether they were societies or parties, because the culture has the greatest influence on the human thought, which affects the course of life. Colonialism set up the education and culture curriculum on the basis of a constant philosophy, which is the viewpoint towards life that separates the matter from the spirit, and separates the religion from the State. Colonialism made of its image alone the basis from which we extract/obtain our culture. It also made its own revival, concepts, the components of its countries, its history and its medium the original source for the stuff filled in our minds …”

Page 24 “This partisan bond is the doctrine, from which the philosophy of the party emerges; and it is the culture that characterizes the concepts of the party. As such, the party bloc would have been formed, and functioned in the realm of life …”

It is clear that there is no confusion in these issues.

15 Rabee’ II 1432

20/3/2011

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Question Thirteen:

Does the land that construed to (Islamic) Waqf, and its original description was Kharaji land pay Kharaj; such as the Waqf of Tamim ad-Dari in Palestine and elsewhere?

Answer:

1- The Kharaji land is not made (Islamic) Waqf; and thus it remains as Kharaji, and Kharaj is paid on it.

According to Article 133 of the Draft Constitution, Part II, the following is mentioned:

“The ‘Ushri (tenth) and Kharaji land is allowed to be exchanged and inherited from its owner, because it is a real property of its owner; so all of the provisions of property apply to it. This is apparent regarding the ‘Ushri land. As regarding the Kharaji land, its ownership is quite the same like the ‘Ushri land in terms of ownership. There is no difference between the two types except in two issues only: one of them is regarding the essence of the property; where the owner of the ‘Ushri land owns its body/neck and its benefit/utilty. While the owner of the Kharaji land owns its benefit/utility only and does not own its body/neck. It follows that if the owner of the ‘Ushri land wanted to make the land which he owns as waqf he can do so at any time he wishes, because he owns its body/neck and benefit/utility. The owner of the Kharaji land, on the other side, if he wanted to make the land which he owned he cannot do that, because it is stipulated in the waqf that its provider must be owner of its body/neck, whereas the owner of the Kharaji land does not own the essence of the land, ie its body/neck. He rather owns its benefit/utility, because its body is owned by Bait ul-mal.

As regards what is due on the land …”

2- The land of Tamim ad-Dari is not Kharaji land, for it was allocated to Tamim by the Messenger of Allah, peace be upon him before the conquest; so it is an ‘Ushri land …

The following came in the book of Shakhsiyyah, vol 2, under the subject of the ‘Ushri lands … P. 240, last paragraph, in the process of counting the ‘Ushri lands:

“… Added to this is the land which the Imam donates before its conquest once it was conquered by Muslims. This would be like a booty for whom it is allocated to, such as the Prophet’s, peace be upon him, donation to Tamim ad-Dari the land of Habre, Hebron, Almarhon and ‘Enoon in Hebron. When Tamim ad- Dari together with his people came as delegate to the Messenger of Allah, peace be upon him, he asked him to donate him these places if Allah opened them to Muslims, so he donated them to him, and he gave him a letter to that effect. Omar was one of the witnesses on that book. When Muslims conquered these places at the time of Omar, he demanded them from Omar, so he gave them to him as fulfillment to the donation of the Messenger of Allah, peace be upon him;  Abu Obeid narrated similar to this in his book of al-Amwal (Funds) … “

Thus, the land of Tamim ad-Dari, may Allah be pleased with him, is an ‘Ushri land; and since it is given as waqf to Muslims, then there is no Zakat in it because Zakat is in the property whose owner is defined … and not in the public property.

20 Rabee’ II 1432

25/03/2011

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Question Fourteen:

It came in the book of Shakhsiiyyah, vol 3, p. 103 under the subject of “the silence of the prophet, peace be upon him” the following: “If somebody did an actual action in front of the Prophet, peace be upon him, or at his time, while he was aware of it and able to denounce it, and remained silent about it” … etc. The following came in the next page: “and that the Messenger was able to denounce it”…

Does this restriction “and that the Messenger was able to denounce it” have an actual reality in the life of the Prophet, peace be upon him? Is it envisaged practically that the Prophet, peace be upon him, might be unable to denounce it at any time? For the Messenger, peace be upon him, is capable to convey the message and denounce the evil always, and he would not delay the statement from its right time. Please explain the issue.

Answer:

As regarding the question about the silence of the Messenger, peace be upon him, scholars of ‘Usool, when they define any matter, they approach it from all of its aspects so that the definition would be inclusive (jaami’) and restrictive (maani’) .

So they have placed here in the definition this restriction “unable to denounce it” so as no one would object to the definition, by speaking about the possibility that something might happen to the Prophet, peace be upon him, as it happens to humans, in terms of the inability to denounce for some reason, so the silence would not then be evidence of agreement!

In conclusion, this restriction is to make the definition inclusive and conclusive, and it had no actual reality in the era of the Prophet, peace be upon him. Al-Aamidy commented in his book al-‘Ihkam on this restriction in the definition, and he responded to those who refused the silence as evidence and said: “It is possible that the Messenger, peace be upon him, did not forbid him because there was something that prevented him from denouncing”. Al-‘Aamidy in his response to them said:” What they have mentioned of the likelihood of the presence of a preventor , though this might be the case rationally, but in origin such a preventor does not exist, “in relation with the Prophet, peace be upon him.

21 Rabee’ II 1432

26/3/2011

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Question Fifteen:

The scholars differed about considering the Basmalah a verse of the Fatiha and of the remaining verses.  Some of them denied it under the pretext of being not Mutawaatir, while some else approved it on the grounds of being established in the Quraan through writing; and they supported their views by quoting the Ahadeeth. So, what is the correct opinion on this issue? Then, is the difference in such issue justified? May Allah bless you?) End.

Answer:

As regarding the Basmalah, it is from the Quraan as part of the verse of ants (An-Naml):

(It is from Solomon and it is Bismillah ir-Rahman ir-Rahim.)

But at the beginning of Al-Fatihah or the beginning of the chapters, it is subject to difference in terms of being a verse of the surah/chapter or it just separates between the surahs/chapters … This difference does not harm, because both sides admit it’s from the Qur’an in the Surat of the ants (An-Naml), and the difference is over its place at the beginning of the surahs, except surah of At-Tawbah. In other words: Is it a verse at the beginning of the surahs, or is it a verse at the beginning of the Fatihah; or it is not a verse, neither at the beginning of the surahs and nor at the beginning of the Fatihah?  … As long as everyone acknowledges it as a verse from the Quraan in Surat An-Naml, then the difference over it at the beginning of the Surahs has no affect except  in whether it is read or not in the prayer, at the beginning of the Fatihah or at the beginning of the surahs, openly or secretly, according to the Islamic rules deduced by mujtahideen.

21 Rabee’ II 1432

26/3/2011

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Question Sixteen:

1. The following came in the Shakhsiyyah, vol III, p. 148, line 13: “There are names, which Arabs have not coined for meanings at all, but Shar’ came and coined them for certain meanings,; while there are names, which Arabs did not have meanings for them before.” My question is: Are there examples for these types of names?

2. The following came in the Shakhsiyyah, vol III, p. 136 line 10: “Such as the term of Rooh (spirit) to denote the secret of life, and the realization of the relation with Allah, and Jibreel.” My question is: Is this a good example for a homonym (Ishtiraak), because the secret of life is a linguistic meaning, and the realization of the relation with Allah is a technical (Istilahi) meaning, ie specific conventional, and Gabriel is a divine meaning; where Ishtirak (homonym) is the multitude of linguistic meanings for the same term, which does not exist here.

Answer:

1 – The answer to the divine names is:

a) “There are names which Arabs did not put meanings to them at all and Shar’ came and put them for specific meanings”…

Such as the beginnings of the surahs like alif lam meem, alif lam raa… These are names of surahs, but Arabs never coined them for meanings…

b) “And there are names which Arabs did not know their meanings before”…

These are such as “Wuduu'”, where Arabs did not know its meaning till Shar’ put it to that term. This is not like Salah, which Arabs used for supplication (du’aa), and then Shar’ came and transferred it to the known Salah. For, Arabs did not know the meaning of Wudoo’  till Shar’ put it.

2 – The issue of the homonym (mushtarak):

The linguistic meaning, together with the divine meaning or the conventional meaning are not included in the subject of homonyms (mushtarak), which is true … But this is the case if the divine meaning and the conventional meaning dominated while the linguistic meaning was abandoned or nearly so, such that when you hear the word, the mind turns to the divine or conventional meaning, without the need for a collaboration (qareenah).

For example, the word of  Salah “prayer” has a linguistic meaning, which is “supplication”, and a divine meaning, which is the ” usual prayer – salah”. Transference to this meaning dominated such that when you hear the word “prayer – salah” the mind turns to the usual prayer – salah without the need for collaboration (qareenah).

In this case it is incorrect to say the prayer (salah) is a homonym (mushtarak), thus meaning both supplication (du’aa) and the usual prayer (salah). This is because though these two meanings are different, but this difference between them is not the same such that the identification of the intended meaning requires collaboration when hearing the word. Rather, one of them has dominated over the other, such that the other was abandoned or nearly so, once the word was pronounced. This applies to the word  “Daabbah” (animal), which cannot be treated as a homonym that means “every thing that creeps/treads on the ground and the well known animal”. This is because though these two meanings are different, but this difference between them is not the same such that the identification of the intended meaning requires collaboration when hearing the word. Rather, one of them (namely the animal) has dominated over the other, such that the other was abandoned or nearly so, once the word was pronounced.

These words and their likes of the linguistic, divine and conventional meanings as mentioned above do not come under the subject of homonyms (mushtarak). This is because the divine and conventional meanings have dominated over the linguistic meaning. So, each of these meanings is like the singular (mufrad) that carries one meaning. While the homonym indicates two or more different facts; so the identification of the intended meaning requires collaboration… This is like of the word of (‘ayn), which is common in ‘ayn (eye) with which we see, and ‘ayn which means water spring, and ‘ayn which means spy … It is clear there is differences in these meanings, and they need a collaboration to determine the intended meaning.

As regards the technical or divine meaning that does not dominate, and the linguistic meaning that was abandoned or nearly so, it is allowed to involve them with the linguistic meaning in the subject of the homonyms (mushtarak). This is because they are all equal in the difference when they are heard, or nearly equal, without domination of one of them over the other; rather the intended meaning requires collaboration, and thus these meanings fall under homonyms.

Thus, the word of spirit (rooh) came in many meanings:

* It is the soul by which the body lives “secret of life”, and the Christ ( spirit of Allah Almighty” and Rooh ” Gabriel – peace be upon him”, as it came  in the saying of Allah “Rooh ul-qudus  – the Holy Spirit”. Rooh is also used to mean Qur’an, Wahy (revelation), Nafkh (blowing), the matter of prophethood, the rule of Allah, the Almighty, and the order of Allah…

As you can see, these are meanings which are equal in the difference, where the divine meaning did not dominate over the linguistic meaning such that it was abandoned or nearly so. So, if you heard the word of the soul (Rooh), the mind would not turn to Gabriel, or Jesus, peace be upon them, or the Qur’an, or blowing, or the rule of Allah, the Almighty … without a collaboration (qareena).

This applies to the technical meaning of “realization of the relation with Allah,”, which is not a general conventional fact like the word of Daabbah (animal), for example, such that when its linguistic meaning has been abandoned or nearly so, where this special conventional meaning “realization of the relation with Allah” dominated over the linguistic meaning “secret life …”. Rather, this technical meaning is not understood without collaboration from the mere hearing the word of spirit (rooh). Moreover, this word with this meaning is hardly mentioned by many scholars of ‘Usool except by us and our likes who understand this technical meaning …

Since these meanings do not dominate over the linguistic meaning to the point it was abandoned or nearly so; they are rather equal in their difference and need collaboration for determining the intended meaning, so it is allowed to treat these meanings together with the linguistic meaning as common.

 

26 Rabi’ II 1432
2011/03/31